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DATE 2014-01-01

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Key: Value:

Key: Value:

MESSAGE
DATE 2014-01-01
FROM Ruben Safir
SUBJECT Subject: [NYLXS - HANGOUT] 4th amendment protections

http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/the-nsa-uses-powerful-toolbox-in-effort-to-spy-on-global-networks-a-940969-druck.html

SPIEGEL ONLINE
12/29/2013 09:18 AM
Inside TAO
Documents Reveal Top NSA Hacking Unit

By SPIEGEL Staff

The NSA's TAO hacking unit is considered to be the intelligence agency's
top secret weapon. It maintains its own covert network, infiltrates
computers around the world and even intercepts shipping deliveries to
plant back doors in electronics ordered by those it is targeting.

In January 2010, numerous homeowners in San Antonio, Texas, stood
baffled in front of their closed garage doors. They wanted to drive to
work or head off to do their grocery shopping, but their garage door
openers had gone dead, leaving them stranded. No matter how many times
they pressed the buttons, the doors didn't budge. The problem primarily
affected residents in the western part of the city, around Military
Drive and the interstate highway known as Loop 410.

In the United States, a country of cars and commuters, the mysterious
garage door problem quickly became an issue for local politicians.
Ultimately, the municipal government solved the riddle. Fault for the
error lay with the United States' foreign intelligence service, the
National Security Agency, which has offices in San Antonio. Officials at
the agency were forced to admit that one of the NSA's radio antennas was
broadcasting at the same frequency as the garage door openers.
Embarrassed officials at the intelligence agency promised to resolve the
issue as quickly as possible, and soon the doors began opening again.

It was thanks to the garage door opener episode that Texans learned just
how far the NSA's work had encroached upon their daily lives. For quite
some time now, the intelligence agency has maintained a branch with
around 2,000 employees at Lackland Air Force Base, also in San Antonio.
In 2005, the agency took over a former Sony computer chip plant in the
western part of the city. A brisk pace of construction commenced inside
this enormous compound. The acquisition of the former chip factory at
Sony Place was part of a massive expansion the agency began after the
events of Sept. 11, 2001.

On-Call Digital Plumbers

One of the two main buildings at the former plant has since housed a
sophisticated NSA unit, one that has benefited the most from this
expansion and has grown the fastest in recent years -- the Office of
Tailored Access Operations, or TAO. This is the NSA's top operative unit
-- something like a squad of plumbers that can be called in when normal
access to a target is blocked.

According to internal NSA documents viewed by SPIEGEL, these on-call
digital plumbers are involved in many sensitive operations conducted by
American intelligence agencies. TAO's area of operations ranges from
counterterrorism to cyber attacks to traditional espionage. The
documents reveal just how diversified the tools at TAO's disposal have
become -- and also how it exploits the technical weaknesses of the IT
industry, from Microsoft to Cisco and Huawei, to carry out its discreet
and efficient attacks.

The unit is "akin to the wunderkind of the US intelligence community,"
says Matthew Aid, a historian who specializes in the history of the NSA.
"Getting the ungettable" is the NSA's own description of its duties. "It
is not about the quantity produced but the quality of intelligence that
is important," one former TAO chief wrote, describing her work in a
document. The paper seen by SPIEGEL quotes the former unit head stating
that TAO has contributed "some of the most significant intelligence our
country has ever seen." The unit, it goes on, has "access to our very
hardest targets."

A Unit Born of the Internet

Defining the future of her unit at the time, she wrote that TAO "needs
to continue to grow and must lay the foundation for integrated Computer
Network Operations," and that it must "support Computer Network Attacks
as an integrated part of military operations." To succeed in this, she
wrote, TAO would have to acquire "pervasive, persistent access on the
global network." An internal description of TAO's responsibilities makes
clear that aggressive attacks are an explicit part of the unit's tasks.
In other words, the NSA's hackers have been given a government mandate
for their work. During the middle part of the last decade, the special
unit succeeded in gaining access to 258 targets in 89 countries --
nearly everywhere in the world. In 2010, it conducted 279 operations
worldwide.

Indeed, TAO specialists have directly accessed the protected networks of
democratically elected leaders of countries. They infiltrated networks
of European telecommunications companies and gained access to and read
mails sent over Blackberry's BES email servers, which until then were
believed to be securely encrypted. Achieving this last goal required a
"sustained TAO operation," one document states.

This TAO unit is born of the Internet -- created in 1997, a time when
not even 2 percent of the world's population had Internet access and no
one had yet thought of Facebook, YouTube or Twitter. From the time the
first TAO employees moved into offices at NSA headquarters in Fort
Meade, Maryland, the unit was housed in a separate wing, set apart from
the rest of the agency. Their task was clear from the beginning -- to
work around the clock to find ways to hack into global communications
traffic.

Recruiting the Geeks

To do this, the NSA needed a new kind of employee. The TAO workers
authorized to access the special, secure floor on which the unit is
located are for the most part considerably younger than the average NSA
staff member. Their job is breaking into, manipulating and exploiting
computer networks, making them hackers and civil servants in one. Many
resemble geeks -- and act the part, too.

Indeed, it is from these very circles that the NSA recruits new hires
for its Tailored Access Operations unit. In recent years, NSA Director
Keith Alexander has made several appearances at major hacker conferences
in the United States. Sometimes, Alexander wears his military uniform,
but at others, he even dons jeans and a t-shirt in his effort to court
trust and a new generation of employees.

The recruitment strategy seems to have borne fruit. Certainly, few if
any other divisions within the agency are growing as quickly as TAO.
There are now TAO units in Wahiawa, Hawaii; Fort Gordon, Georgia; at the
NSA's outpost at Buckley Air Force Base, near Denver, Colorado; at its
headquarters in Fort Meade; and, of course, in San Antonio.

One trail also leads to Germany. According to a document dating from
2010 that lists the "Lead TAO Liaisons" domestically and abroad as well
as names, email addresses and the number for their "Secure Phone," a
liaison office is located near Frankfurt -- the European Security
Operations Center (ESOC) at the so-called "Dagger Complex" at a US
military compound in the Griesheim suburb of Darmstadt.

But it is the growth of the unit's Texas branch that has been uniquely
impressive, the top secret documents reviewed by SPIEGEL show. These
documents reveal that in 2008, the Texas Cryptologic Center employed
fewer than 60 TAO specialists. By 2015, the number is projected to grow
to 270 employees. In addition, there are another 85 specialists in the
"Requirements & Targeting" division (up from 13 specialists in 2008).
The number of software developers is expected to increase from the 2008
level of three to 38 in 2015. The San Antonio office handles attacks
against targets in the Middle East, Cuba, Venezuela and Colombia, not to
mention Mexico, just 200 kilometers (124 miles) away, where the
government has fallen into the NSA's crosshairs.

Targeting Mexico
Mexico's Secretariat of Public Security, which was folded into the new
National Security Commission at the beginning of 2013, was responsible
at the time for the country's police, counterterrorism, prison system
and border police. Most of the agency's nearly 20,000 employees worked
at its headquarters on Avenida Constituyentes, an important traffic
artery in Mexico City. A large share of the Mexican security authorities
under the auspices of the Secretariat are supervised from the offices
there, making Avenida Constituyentes a one-stop shop for anyone seeking
to learn more about the country's security apparatus.

Operation WHITETAMALE

That considered, assigning the TAO unit responsible for tailored
operations to target the Secretariat makes a lot of sense. After all,
one document states, the US Department of Homeland Security and the
United States' intelligence agencies have a need to know everything
about the drug trade, human trafficking and security along the US-Mexico
border. The Secretariat presents a potential "goldmine" for the NSA's
spies, a document states. The TAO workers selected systems
administrators and telecommunications engineers at the Mexican agency as
their targets, thus marking the start of what the unit dubbed Operation
WHITETAMALE.

Workers at NSA's target selection office, which also had Angela Merkel
in its sights in 2002 before she became chancellor, sent TAO a list of
officials within the Mexican Secretariat they thought might make
interesting targets. As a first step, TAO penetrated the target
officials' email accounts, a relatively simple job. Next, they
infiltrated the entire network and began capturing data.

Soon the NSA spies had knowledge of the agency's servers, including IP
addresses, computers used for email traffic and individual addresses of
diverse employees. They also obtained diagrams of the security agencies'
structures, including video surveillance. It appears the operation
continued for years until SPIEGEL first reported on it in October.

The technical term for this type of activity is "Computer Network
Exploitation" (CNE). The goal here is to "subvert endpoint devices,"
according to an internal NSA presentation that SPIEGEL has viewed. The
presentation goes on to list nearly all the types of devices that run
our digital lives -- "servers, workstations, firewalls, routers,
handsets, phone switches, SCADA systems, etc." SCADAs are industrial
control systems used in factories, as well as in power plants. Anyone
who can bring these systems under their control has the potential to
knock out parts of a country's critical infrastructure.

The most well-known and notorious use of this type of attack was the
development of Stuxnet, the computer worm whose existence was discovered
in June 2010. The virus was developed jointly by American and Israeli
intelligence agencies to sabotage Iran's nuclear program, and
successfully so. The country's nuclear program was set back by years
after Stuxnet manipulated the SCADA control technology used at Iran's
uranium enrichment facilities in Natanz, rendering up to 1,000
centrifuges unusable.

The special NSA unit has its own development department in which new
technologies are developed and tested. This division is where the real
tinkerers can be found, and their inventiveness when it comes to finding
ways to infiltrate other networks, computers and smartphones evokes a
modern take on Q, the legendary gadget inventor in James Bond movies.

Having Fun at Microsoft's Expense

One example of the sheer creativity with which the TAO spies approach
their work can be seen in a hacking method they use that exploits the
error-proneness of Microsoft's Windows. Every user of the operating
system is familiar with the annoying window that occasionally pops up on
screen when an internal problem is detected, an automatic message that
prompts the user to report the bug to the manufacturer and to restart
the program. These crash reports offer TAO specialists a welcome
opportunity to spy on computers.

When TAO selects a computer somewhere in the world as a target and
enters its unique identifiers (an IP address, for example) into the
corresponding database, intelligence agents are then automatically
notified any time the operating system of that computer crashes and its
user receives the prompt to report the problem to Microsoft. An internal
presentation suggests it is NSA's powerful XKeyscore spying tool that is
used to fish these crash reports out of the massive sea of Internet
traffic.

The automated crash reports are a "neat way" to gain "passive access" to
a machine, the presentation continues. Passive access means that,
initially, only data the computer sends out into the Internet is
captured and saved, but the computer itself is not yet manipulated.
Still, even this passive access to error messages provides valuable
insights into problems with a targeted person's computer and, thus,
information on security holes that might be exploitable for planting
malware or spyware on the unwitting victim's computer.

Although the method appears to have little importance in practical
terms, the NSA's agents still seem to enjoy it because it allows them to
have a bit of a laugh at the expense of the Seattle-based software
giant. In one internal graphic, they replaced the text of Microsoft's
original error message with one of their own reading, "This information
may be intercepted by a foreign sigint system to gather detailed
information and better exploit your machine." ("Sigint" stands for
"signals intelligence.")

One of the hackers' key tasks is the offensive infiltration of target
computers with so-called implants or with large numbers of Trojans.
They've bestowed their spying tools with illustrious monikers like
"ANGRY NEIGHBOR," "HOWLERMONKEY" or "WATERWITCH." These names may sound
cute, but the tools they describe are both aggressive and effective.

According to details in Washington's current budget plan for the US
intelligence services, around 85,000 computers worldwide are projected
to be infiltrated by the NSA specialists by the end of this year. By far
the majority of these "implants" are conducted by TAO teams via the
Internet.

Increasing Sophistication

Until just a few years ago, NSA agents relied on the same methods
employed by cyber criminals to conduct these implants on computers. They
sent targeted attack emails disguised as spam containing links directing
users to virus-infected websites. With sufficient knowledge of an
Internet browser's security holes -- Microsoft's Internet Explorer, for
example, is especially popular with the NSA hackers -- all that is
needed to plant NSA malware on a person's computer is for that
individual to open a website that has been specially crafted to
compromise the user's computer. Spamming has one key drawback though: It
doesn't work very often.

Nevertheless, TAO has dramatically improved the tools at its disposal.
It maintains a sophisticated toolbox known internally by the name
"QUANTUMTHEORY." "Certain QUANTUM missions have a success rate of as
high as 80%, where spam is less than 1%," one internal NSA presentation
states.

A comprehensive internal presentation titled "QUANTUM CAPABILITIES,"
which SPIEGEL has viewed, lists virtually every popular Internet service
provider as a target, including Facebook, Yahoo, Twitter and YouTube.
"NSA QUANTUM has the greatest success against Yahoo, Facebook and static
IP addresses," it states. The presentation also notes that the NSA has
been unable to employ this method to target users of Google services.
Apparently, that can only be done by Britain's GCHQ intelligence
service, which has acquired QUANTUM tools from the NSA.

A favored tool of intelligence service hackers is "QUANTUMINSERT." GCHQ
workers used this method to attack the computers of employees at partly
government-held Belgian telecommunications company Belgacom, in order to
use their computers to penetrate even further into the company's
networks. The NSA, meanwhile, used the same technology to target
high-ranking members of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting
Countries (OPEC) at the organization's Vienna headquarters. In both
cases, the trans-Atlantic spying consortium gained unhindered access to
valuable economic data using these tools.

The NSA's Shadow Network
The insert method and other variants of QUANTUM are closely linked to a
shadow network operated by the NSA alongside the Internet, with its own,
well-hidden infrastructure comprised of "covert" routers and servers. It
appears the NSA also incorporates routers and servers from non-NSA
networks into its covert network by infecting these networks with
"implants" that then allow the government hackers to control the
computers remotely. (Click here to read a related article on the NSA's
"implants".)

In this way, the intelligence service seeks to identify and track its
targets based on their digital footprints. These identifiers could
include certain email addresses or website cookies set on a person's
computer. Of course, a cookie doesn't automatically identify a person,
but it can if it includes additional information like an email address.
In that case, a cookie becomes something like the web equivalent of a
fingerprint.

A Race Between Servers

Once TAO teams have gathered sufficient data on their targets' habits,
they can shift into attack mode, programming the QUANTUM systems to
perform this work in a largely automated way. If a data packet featuring
the email address or cookie of a target passes through a cable or router
monitored by the NSA, the system sounds the alarm. It determines what
website the target person is trying to access and then activates one of
the intelligence service's covert servers, known by the codename
FOXACID.

This NSA server coerces the user into connecting to NSA covert systems
rather than the intended sites. In the case of Belgacom engineers,
instead of reaching the LinkedIn page they were actually trying to
visit, they were also directed to FOXACID servers housed on NSA
networks. Undetected by the user, the manipulated page transferred
malware already custom tailored to match security holes on the target
person's computer.

The technique can literally be a race between servers, one that is
described in internal intelligence agency jargon with phrases like:
"Wait for client to initiate new connection," "Shoot!" and "Hope to beat
server-to-client response." Like any competition, at times the covert
network's surveillance tools are "too slow to win the race." Often
enough, though, they are effective. Implants with QUANTUMINSERT,
especially when used in conjunction with LinkedIn, now have a success
rate of over 50 percent, according to one internal document.

Tapping Undersea Cables

At the same time, it is in no way true to say that the NSA has its
sights set exclusively on select individuals. Of even greater interest
are entire networks and network providers, such as the fiber optic
cables that direct a large share of global Internet traffic along the
world's ocean floors.

One document labeled "top secret" and "not for foreigners" describes the
NSA's success in spying on the "SEA-ME-WE-4" cable system. This massive
underwater cable bundle connects Europe with North Africa and the Gulf
states and then continues on through Pakistan and India, all the way to
Malaysia and Thailand. The cable system originates in southern France,
near Marseille. Among the companies that hold ownership stakes in it are
France Telecom, now known as Orange and still partly government-owned,
and Telecom Italia Sparkle.

The document proudly announces that, on Feb. 13, 2013, TAO "successfully
collected network management information for the SEA-Me-We Undersea
Cable Systems (SMW-4)." With the help of a "website masquerade
operation," the agency was able to "gain access to the consortium's
management website and collected Layer 2 network information that shows
the circuit mapping for significant portions of the network."

It appears the government hackers succeeded here once again using the
QUANTUMINSERT method.

The document states that the TAO team hacked an internal website of the
operator consortium and copied documents stored there pertaining to
technical infrastructure. But that was only the first step. "More
operations are planned in the future to collect more information about
this and other cable systems," it continues.

But numerous internal announcements of successful attacks like the one
against the undersea cable operator aren't the exclusive factors that
make TAO stand out at the NSA. In contrast to most NSA operations, TAO's
ventures often require physical access to their targets. After all, you
might have to directly access a mobile network transmission station
before you can begin tapping the digital information it provides.

Spying Traditions Live On

To conduct those types of operations, the NSA works together with other
intelligence agencies such as the CIA and FBI, which in turn maintain
informants on location who are available to help with sensitive
missions. This enables TAO to attack even isolated networks that aren't
connected to the Internet. If necessary, the FBI can even make an
agency-owned jet available to ferry the high-tech plumbers to their
target. This gets them to their destination at the right time and can
help them to disappear again undetected after as little as a half hour's
work.

Responding to a query from SPIEGEL, NSA officials issued a statement
saying, "Tailored Access Operations is a unique national asset that is
on the front lines of enabling NSA to defend the nation and its allies."
The statement added that TAO's "work is centered on computer network
exploitation in support of foreign intelligence collection." The
officials said they would not discuss specific allegations regarding
TAO's mission.

Sometimes it appears that the world's most modern spies are just as
reliant on conventional methods of reconnaissance as their predecessors.

Take, for example, when they intercept shipping deliveries. If a target
person, agency or company orders a new computer or related accessories,
for example, TAO can divert the shipping delivery to its own secret
workshops. The NSA calls this method interdiction. At these so-called
"load stations," agents carefully open the package in order to load
malware onto the electronics, or even install hardware components that
can provide backdoor access for the intelligence agencies. All
subsequent steps can then be conducted from the comfort of a remote
computer.

These minor disruptions in the parcel shipping business rank among the
"most productive operations" conducted by the NSA hackers, one top
secret document relates in enthusiastic terms. This method, the
presentation continues, allows TAO to obtain access to networks "around
the world."

Even in the Internet Age, some traditional spying methods continue to
live on.

REPORTED BY JACOB APPELBAUM, LAURA POITRAS, MARCEL ROSENBACH, CHRISTIAN
STÖCKER, JÖRG SCHINDLER AND HOLGER STARK
URL:

http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/the-nsa-uses-powerful-toolbox-in-effort-to-spy-on-global-networks-a-940969.html

Related SPIEGEL ONLINE links:

Shopping for Spy Gear Catalog Advertises NSA Toolbox (12/29/2013)
http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,940994,00.html
Friendly Fire How GCHQ Monitors Germany, Israel and the EU
(12/20/2013)
http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,940135,00.html
Oil Espionage How the NSA and GCHQ Spied on OPEC (11/11/2013)
http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,932777,00.html
Fresh Leak on US Spying NSA Accessed Mexican President's Email
(10/20/2013)
http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,928817,00.html
Quantum Spying GCHQ Used Fake LinkedIn Pages to Target Engineers
(11/11/2013)
http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,932821,00.html
Ally and Target US Intelligence Watches Germany Closely (08/12/2013)
http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,916029,00.html

Related internet links

"Washington Post": Bericht über Cyber-Attacken 2011
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-spy-agencies-mounted-231-offensive-cyber-operations-in-2011-documents-show/2013/08/30/d090a6ae-119e-11e3-b4cb-fd7ce041d814_story.html
SPIEGEL ONLINE is not liable for the content of external web pages.

© SPIEGEL ONLINE 2013
All Rights Reserved
Reproduction only allowed with the permission of SPIEGELnet GmbH

  1. 2014-01-01 Ruben Safir <mrbrklyn-at-panix.com> Subject: [NYLXS - HANGOUT] 4th amendment protections
  2. 2014-01-01 Ruben Safir <mrbrklyn-at-panix.com> Subject: [NYLXS - HANGOUT] cellphones and mr hooper
  3. 2014-01-02 Ruben Safir <mrbrklyn-at-panix.com> Subject: [NYLXS - HANGOUT] NYLXS Tech Support
  4. 2014-01-03 Elfen Magix <elfen_magix-at-yahoo.com> Re: [NYLXS - HANGOUT] NYLXS Tech Support
  5. 2014-01-03 Ruben Safir <mrbrklyn-at-panix.com> Re: [NYLXS - HANGOUT] NYLXS Tech Support
  6. 2014-01-06 Ruben Safir <mrbrklyn-at-panix.com> Subject: [NYLXS - HANGOUT] Balance
  7. 2014-01-17 Ruben Safir <mrbrklyn-at-panix.com> Subject: [NYLXS - HANGOUT] [ruben-at-mrbrklyn.com: [whitemr-at-gmail.com: [Dclug] Hiring a Linux
  8. 2014-01-23 Ruben Safir <mrbrklyn-at-panix.com> Subject: [NYLXS - HANGOUT] no time to waste.
  9. 2014-01-23 Ruben <mrbrklyn-at-panix.com> Subject: [NYLXS - HANGOUT] DavidLowery should get a real job
  10. 2014-01-23 Ruben <mrbrklyn-at-panix.com> Subject: [NYLXS - HANGOUT] just for fun
  11. 2014-01-26 Ruben Safir <mrbrklyn-at-panix.com> Subject: [NYLXS - HANGOUT] suse conference
  12. 2014-01-28 Ruben Safir <mrbrklyn-at-panix.com> Subject: [NYLXS - HANGOUT] Video Event
  13. 2014-01-28 Ruben Safir <mrbrklyn-at-panix.com> Subject: [NYLXS - HANGOUT] all your words are mine
  14. 2014-01-28 Ruben Safir <mrbrklyn-at-panix.com> Subject: [NYLXS - HANGOUT] great gimp tutorial
  15. 2014-01-29 Ruben Safir <mrbrklyn-at-panix.com> Subject: [NYLXS - HANGOUT] wmaker
  16. 2014-01-29 Ruben Safir <mrbrklyn-at-panix.com> Subject: [NYLXS - HANGOUT] Field trip this summer
  17. 2014-01-30 Ruben Safir <mrbrklyn-at-panix.com> Subject: [NYLXS - HANGOUT] good girl
  18. 2014-01-30 Ruben Safir <mrbrklyn-at-panix.com> Subject: [NYLXS - HANGOUT] Chinese Takover of NYLXS

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